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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-4425
___________
GARY ALAN ADLER,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States Tax Court
(T.C. No. 07-28454, 07-28455, 07-28456, & 07-28457)
Tax Court Judge: Honorable David Gustafson
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 26, 2011
Before: RENDELL, CHAGARES and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 29, 2011 )
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Gary Adler, proceeding pro se, appeals a decision of the United States Tax Court
sustaining a tax deficiency and addition to tax determined by the Internal Revenue
Service (“IRS”). For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the Tax Court's decision.
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I.
Because we write only for the parties, who are familiar with the facts, we will not
recite them except as necessary to the discussion. In the Fall of 2007, the IRS issued
notices of deficiency to Adler determining that he owed federal income taxes for the
years 2001 through 2004, as well as additions to tax under 26 U.S.C. §§ 6651 and 6654.
Adler timely filed petitions with the Tax Court challenging the IRS’s determinations.
After concessions before that court, the only issues remaining were whether Adler was
entitled to deductions for business losses sustained as a result of his sale of flowers and
vegetables (“greenhouse activity”) and his wife’s sale of rubber stamps and related
products to stamping hobbyists (“stamping activity”), and whether he was entitled to
dependency deductions and education credits relating to his support of his daughter and
her husband, and whether he was liable for the additions to tax.
The Tax Court determined that Adler did not timely file tax returns for the period
in question, that he bore the burden of proof as to any claimed deduction or credit, and
that he failed to meet that burden. In fact, the Tax Court found that Adler failed to
produce credible evidence with respect to any factual issue. Adler v. Comm’r, 2010-47,
2010 WL 934267, at *7 (T.C. Memo. 2010). Accordingly, it held that he was not entitled
to the deductions and credits he claimed. After the Tax Court issued its opinion Adler
moved for a retrial. The Tax Court denied his motion, and Adler timely appealed.
II.
We have jurisdiction to review decisions of the Tax Court under 26 U.S.C.
2

§ 7482(a)(1). We review the Tax Court's factual findings for clear error and exercise
plenary review over its conclusions of law. See PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Comm’r, 212 F.3d
822, 827 (3d Cir. 2000). We review the Tax Court's denial of his motion for a new trial
for abuse of discretion. See Estate of Kraus v. Comm’r, 875 F.2d 597, 602 (7th Cir.
1989).
III.
Initially, Adler claimed that he should be excused from producing some of the
pertinent records because they were destroyed in a basement flood in 2006. Other than
his testimony to that effect and several recent photographs showing rust in his basement,
Adler provided no evidence that such a flood occurred. We therefore agree with the Tax
Court’s determination that Adler did not meet his burden of proving that a flood damaged
his records. Consequently, he could not rely upon secondary evidence in lieu of the
original records he avers were destroyed. Tax Ct. R. 142(a)(1). After reviewing the
evidence presented to the Tax Court, 1 we likewise discern no error in its finding that
Adler failed to file to file returns for the tax-years 2001 through 2004.
The record provides ample support for the Tax Court’s determination that Adler’s
claimed business loss deductions and dependency credits were unsubstantiated. Tax
deductions and credits are a matter of legislative grace. See Interstate Transit Lines v.
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Adler attempts to supplement the record by attaching several new documents in his
filing before this Court. We do not consider them. See In re Application of Adan, 437
F.3d 381, 389 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[W]e will not consider new evidence on appeal absent
extraordinary circumstances.”).
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Comm’r, 319 U.S. 590, 593, 63 S. Ct. 1279, 87 L. Ed. 1607, 1943-1 C.B. 1016 (1943).
Thus, the burden is on the taxpayer to show that the expenses are deductible. See
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79, 84, 112 S. Ct. 1039, 117 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1992);
see also Capital Blue Cross & Subsidiaries v. Comm’r, 431 F.3d 117, 128 (3d Cir. 2005).
As the Tax Court noted, none of the evidence Adler submitted was sufficient to meet this
burden.
Adler claimed business loss deductions stemming from losses sustained in his
greenhouse activity and his wife’s stamping activity. To substantiate his greenhouse
losses, Adler submitted into evidence detailed drawings of his greenhouses, seed,
executed contracts between his farm and licensors to grow and sell particular brands of
flowers, seeding schedules for 1995 and 1996, undated seedling and transplanting
schedules, an undated yellow page ad for his farm, commercial automobile insurance
bills, and one page of an unsigned receipt, dated August 20, 1998, that lists various boiler
parts and their prices. Adler, 2010 WL 934267, at *7. Adler stipulated that his wife kept
no regular records of her stamping activity. In fact, the only documentary support he
provided for the claimed stamping losses were two registration confirmation printouts for
a stamping tradeshow and a handful of hotel bills which Mrs. Adler testified were
incurred to attend various stamping events. Id. at *10. Even assuming Adler could claim
any business loss deductions for the greenhouse and stamping activities, the evidence he
submitted offered no substantiation of the amounts of any losses. Accordingly, Adler did
not demonstrate entitlement to the deductions he claimed.
4

Adler’s claimed dependency credits were likewise unsubstantiated. Pursuant to 26
U.S.C. §§ 152(c)(1)(A); (d)(1)(C), a family-member must receive over half of his or her
total support from another in order to be claimed as a dependent of that person. The Tax
Court found it plausible that Adler supported his daughter through college and
conceivable that that he had done so for her husband. However, he apparently kept no
records of how much was spent to support them during the relevant tax-years, nor did he
provide credible evidence as to the total support amounts. This being the case, Adler
could not demonstrate that he had provided the requisite proportion of support to claim a
dependency credit for either his daughter or her husband.
Adler argues that he should not have born the burden of proving his entitlement to
these deductions and credits; rather, he argues that the burden should have been shifted to
the IRS to prove that he was not. Under 26 U.S.C. § 7491(a)(1), if a taxpayer presents
credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability of
the taxpayer, the burden of proof does shift to the IRS. In this case, however, a § 7491
burden shift was unwarranted because Adler presented no such evidence. Adler
alternatively argues that the burden should have shifted to the IRS because the agency
lacked authority to prepare the substitute returns used to determine his deficiency and that
the documents he supplied should therefore have been presumed to be correct. As the
IRS is directed to prepare such returns by 26 U.S.C. § 6020(b), this argument is meritless.
Adler also contends that the IRS should have born the burden of proof under Rule
142(a)(1) of the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the United States Tax Court (“Tax
5

Court Rules”). He claimed that the deficiency amounts stated in the statutory notice of
deficiency were greater than the amounts the IRS communicated to him on a later date—
he argued the initial, greater amount constitutes an “increase in deficiency” for the
purposes of the burden of proof. As the Tax Court noted, Adler did not submit into
evidence any of the IRS communications he referenced. Even if he had, he alleged that
each of the later values was less than that in the initial notice of deficiency and could not
be considered increases in deficiency to justify shifting the burden of proof to the IRS.
Accordingly, the Tax Court correctly determined that Adler bore the burden of
proof as to each of the deductions and credits he wished to claim. Because he failed to
produce any relevant credible evidence at trial, the Tax Court correctly rejected the
deductions and credits he claimed. The Court correctly sustained the tax deficiency and
additions to tax determined by the IRS. 2
Adler finally argues that the Tax Court erred by denying his motion for a new trial
because his attorney was ineffective and because the IRS failed to disclose the identities
of all individuals likely to have discoverable information pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(a). As to Adler’s ineffectiveness argument, there is no right to of effective assistance

2

Adler argues that the Tax Court erred in failing to reduce the amount of deficiency for
tax-year 2004 to reflect a payment he has already made. As the Tax Court noted in its
decision of August 16, 2010, a deficiency is computed without reference to payments
made against the tax liability. 26 U.S.C. § 6211 (defining “deficiency” for tax purposes).
Adler’s prior payment will be taken into account in determining the amount he has yet to
pay and will be reflected in the assessment of interest. We note that the Tax Court
assessed no addition to tax for tax-year 2004 under 26 U.S.C. § 6651 (providing for
additions to tax for failure to pay).
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of counsel in Tax Court proceedings. Slavin v. Comm’r, 932 F.2d 598, 601 (7th Cir.
1991) (“Shortcomings by counsel may be addressed in malpractice actions; they do not
authorize the loser to litigate from scratch against the original adversary.”). As to Adler’s
argument based on Rule 26(a), we note that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not
apply in Tax Court; rather, the Tax Court Rules do. See N.Y. Football Giants, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 349 F.3d 102, 107 (3d Cir. 2003). The Tax Court Rules codify an expectation
that the parties will make informal attempts to resolve discovery issues “before utilizing
the discovery procedures provided in [the Tax Court Rules].” Tax Ct. R. 70(a)(1). Adler
did not do so, and in fact waited until after his trial was complete to complain.
Accordingly, the Tax Court correctly denied his motion for a retrial.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the decision of the Tax Court.
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